The Japanese Family As An Indicator Of Social Change In The Postwar Era

THE JAPANESE FAMILY AS AN INDICATOR OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR ERA

According to Imamura on page 76 of “Family Culture,” “few [societies] are as consciously aware of family systems” as Japan’s. The postwar family continues to be shaped by the prewar ie system in regards to its organization, ideological underpinnings, and relationships between members. However, economically-driven developments and a growing acceptance of alternative lifestyles are changing the Japanese family in unique ways while reflecting changes in Japanese society itself.

The Japanese ie (household unit), codified in the Meiji period, forms the basis for the modern family system. Traditionally, a male head managed household finances and members while his shufu (wife) managed domestic resources. These were not always separate responsibilities; agricultural and small business households relied on housewives to contribute to income-generating activities (Imamura, “Family Culture” 80). The ie was sustained by the practice of primogeniture by which the eldest son would inherit the household with the expectation of caring for the parents. Younger sons would form subordinate branch houses which continued to support the main branch. During the postwar period, rural, extended families have given way to urban, nuclear families as Japan has industrialized. The declining birthrate, which forced a drop in family size from 5 in 1955 to 2.55 in 2000, was a contributing factor (Sugimoto 83). Nuclear families, however, do not represent a majority of households and retain many characteristics of extended families; neighborhood groups have replaced kin as a source of communal assistance. Households outside of the conventional family structure are growing; single households now constitute one-quarter of Japanese households, reflecting a generation more accepting of lifetime singles and single mothers. (Sugimoto 186).

The Japanese household is founded upon such principles as cross-generational continuity, rank consciousness, and harmony via group orientation (Imamura, “Family Culture” 77). Each household represents a distinct, isolated unit; within the household, privacy is minimized and families are expected to function as a unit. This organization is a manifestation of the interplay between uchi (inner group) and soto (outer group) which produces a gap between family members and outsiders in Japanese society (Fukue 72). There is an emphasis on avoiding personal confrontation to maintain personal relationships and put the needs of the household above the needs of the individual. The koseki (family registry) is the cornerstone of Japanese family organization as a repository of information on family members, past and present. While once reinforced by the need for the ie to function as an ongoing economic entity, group orientation is maintained by family registries as “invisible, but highly effective, [ways] of maintaining patriarchal order” (Mouer 125); any deviant behavior could result in consequences for all family members. This characteristic helps explain the persistence of ie characteristics via the concept of seki: “unless one formally... [belongs] to an organization... one has no proper station in society” (Sugimoto 162).

The emergence in the 1960s of the sarariman (salaryman) significantly contributed to modern conceptions of gender-based divisions of labor in the household (Imamura, “Families as Mirrors” 43). Both men and women were constrained from engaging in activities which didn’t directly support the household. Long office hours often created a divide between a salaryman and his wife and children, partially remedied with the rise of the “new family” in the 1970s. This divide has sometimes resulted in exhaustion-induced domestic violence, representing “injuries... Japan’s corporate system has inflicted upon Japanese families” (Sugimoto 179). However, salarymen have never represented a majority in Japan. In 2006, 60.9% of Japanese establishments had 1-4 employees and professional white-collared workers made up only 29.9% of the labor force in 2005 (see Tables 4.1 and 2.4). The salaryman with a reliable income is instead an ideal representing “a coming of age as an adult member of society” (Mouer 120). Additionally, more Japanese are losing faith in the ideal as “new inequalities in income, wealth, and education” have become pronounced, evidenced by the rise of freelance workers, otaku (individuals with obsessive interests), and NEETs. As women gain earning power, Japanese salarymen are becoming harder pressed to sway potential mates as well, producing such phenomena as foreign marriage brokering for rural Japanese men.

The institution of marriage in Japan, while changing, remains a reflection of ie ideology. Traditionally, marriage was the product of family-arranged introductions known as omiai. The concept of “love marriages,” introduced in the 1970s, has become more popular and such marriages now make up 93.8% of marriages in Japan (Sugimoto 180). Similarly, Japan’s divorce rate has increased since the 1960s but remains “among the lowest recorded in industrially advanced nations” (Sugimoto 160). For decades in the postwar period, ie ideology has served as a deterrent for divorce. Even with the new Civil Code which espouses gender equality, many housewives, dependent on male-generated income and fearful of the consequences of social stigmatization, lack the means to successfully seek divorce. These difficulties have given rise to katei-nai rikon (divorce within marriage) and the rejection of love as an essential component of married life. While the Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1986 and the casualization of labor have increased economic opportunities for women, many remain restrained by marriage, evidenced by Japan’s M-shaped curve for female labor participation which demonstrates consistent exit and reentry into the labor market (see Figure 6.2). As a result, since the 1980s, many women have been delaying marriage, having less children, or entering into a growing “housewife part-time labor market” (Sugimoto 165).

“Japan’s modernization has been carried out not by changing the ie principle but by utilizing it” (Fukue 73). The modern postwar family in Japan continues to reflect ie ideology in its basic form, which has retained gender-based divisions of labor and a dedication to the preservation of the household. However, certain changes “directly connected to economic growth,” such as new lifestyles, decreasing job security, and a growing female labor force, will continue to contribute to the growing diversification of the Japanese family system (Imamura, “Family Culture” 80).

Sources Of Stability And Decline In Tokugawa Japan

SOURCES OF STABILITY AND DECLINE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN

The Tokugawa period (1600-1868) in Japan was marked by unprecedented peace following decades of nearly continuous warfare during the Sengoku period (1467-1573) (Gordon 11). The Tokugawa bakufu quickly moved to bolster social order by implementing harsh restrictions, including limits on provincial daimyo, unequal social class mobility, and interactions with foreigners, which would eventually serve as significant sources of its decline. The main internal cause of the breakdown of the Tokugawa regime, according to “The Meiji Revolution,” “was its unmoving order... amidst a shifting socioeconomic foundation.”

Peace in Tokugawa Japan was made possible in part by a forcible weakening of provincial warlords, or daimyo. Following the Battle of Sekigahara of 1600, Ieyasu Tokugawa and his successors instituted numerous restrictions on daimyo by forbidding formal alliances, managing family marriages, withholding political positions, and requiring pledges of loyalty (Gordon 14-15). The bakufu even confiscated and relocated whole domains, cushioning family domains (shinpan) from domains of previously unallied daimyo (tozama) with domains controlled by close allies (fudai). The policy of sankin-kotai, instituted between 1635 and 1682, placed an unprecedented financial burden on daimyo who were required to live in Edo biennially, producing “hostage” families in Edo, and minimized incentives for armed rebellion (Gordon 15).

These restrictions fed antagonisms towards the Tokugawa bakufu, specifically in the western Japanese provinces which would facilitate the Meiji Restoration of the mid-nineteenth century. The Chōshū Domain, for example, fell from its previous position of power and had over 75% of its former lands confiscated, becoming one of many hotbeds of opposition (Craig 15). During each New Year’s meeting, senior clan leaders would evaluate the plausibility of displacing the Tokugawa bakufu (Craig 16). This dream would be realized some two centuries later, when Chōshū and Satsuma joined forces and successfully challenged Tokugawa rule.

Limits on social mobility within Tokugawa Japan were established by the “four divisions of society” (shi-no-ko-sho) (Varley 168). The samurai class, without a legitimate outlet for militarism, inhabited a restless existence in Tokugawa society, enhanced by feelings of betrayal by a social hierarchy designed to provide it with a privileged position. Social mobility within the samurai class became further restricted by an emphasis of abiding by sumptuary laws and minute differences in rank (Gordon 41). At a time when reformers were appealing for appointing men of merit within the Tokugawa regime and merchants, in charge of handling daimyo finances, gained control over urban centers, many samurai remained vocationally restricted by birth (Gordon 42). The rise of a bourgeoisie culture which celebrated luxury amidst a moralistic backing which condemned it only emphasized such social contradictions into the nineteenth century.

The system of sankin-kotai, mentioned above, helped significantly increase the volume of domestic commerce in Japan, catalyzing the urbanization of several key cities: five to six percent of Japanese people lived in cities with populations over 100,000 by 1700 (Gordon 24). This initial boom, however, was followed by nearly 150 years of economic stagnation, epitomized by morbid living conditions (Gordon 28). Unlike merchants, samurai were dependent on annual feudal stipends vulnerable to price fluctuations; many samurai faced increasing costs of living and became dependent on loans from merchant houses. This was one of many developments which led some Japanese to declare a “violation of the natural hierarchy of the world,” suggesting moral failings for which Tokugawa leaders were responsible (Gordon 30).

The arrival of a Portuguese ship on Tanegashima Island in 1543 served as Japan’s first formal contact with Westerners (Varley 143). Apart from a limited initial exchange, Iematsu Tokugawa soon pursued a policy of seclusion in the 1630s known now as “chained country” (sakoku). Restrictions were placed on foreign imports, geographic mobility, and contact with Westerners as a means of legitimizing Tokugawa leaders as “protectors” of Japanese institutions (Varley 164). This development was aided by a growing segment of academic nationalism within Japan, exemplified by claims of Japanese superiority in Shinron (1825) by Aizawa Seishisai (Varley 232). This dangerous position proved disastrous as the Tokugawa bakufu proved unable to deal with the challenges associated with a renewed foreign presence in the nineteenth century. 

Western nations changed “a low-grade crisis into an acute, revolutionary situation” (Gordon 47). A gradual diffusion of political power had produced relatively weaker shoguns and sparked questions of who should rightfully wield sovereign power in the nineteenth century (Gordon 16). When Abe Masahiro requested help from the daimyo in dealing with Commodore Matthew Perry’s demands in 1853, many daimyo, brought into the political fold for the first time, sensed a newfound weakness in the Tokugawa regime. With Emperor Komei’s refusal to provide imperial ratification for the provisions of the Harris Treaty in 1857-1858, certain groups, including the “men of high purpose” (shishi), emphasized a disconnect between the wills of the emperor and bakufu (Gordon 52-53). The emperor, previously in a politically defunct position, now became a powerful symbol of opposition to Tokugawa rule, demonstrated by popular phrases including sonno joi, and served as a justification for a “restoration” of imperial rule.

The Tokugawa bakufu, in its many attempts to maintain social order in Japan, ended up planting the seeds of its own demise. While policies such as restricting the daimyo, enforcing societal divisions, and pursuing national seclusion initially helped legitimize the Tokugawa regime, its inability to sustain such policies provided an opportunity for opposing forces to overcome positions of subordination. According to Gordon on page 47, as “rulers of outer domains... supported initiatives [at critical moments],” Tokugawa rule slowly crumbled.

Balancing “Native” And “Foreign” Elements In Ancient Japan

BALANCING "NATIVE" AND "FOREIGN" ELEMENTS IN ANCIENT JAPAN

Even with Japan’s geographical isolation, a significant amount of beliefs, ideas, and culture from China and Korea have become crucial components of Japanese civilization. However, as noted by Varley on page 57, “[Japan] did not slavishly copy Chinese [and Korean] civilization; some important institutions... were considerably remodeled.” The Japanese have selectively reshaped cultural borrowings to produce uniquely native traditions, as shown by the integration of written language, religion, and bureaucratic institutions from the Asian mainland.

When Korean scholars introduced the Chinese writing system to the Japanese at the beginning of the fifth century, Japanese civilization evolved in a variety of ways. Even with the structural differences between Chinese and Japanese, written Chinese had become an established form of official communication by the time a permanent capital was built at Nara in 710 (Varley 36). The imperial court’s dependence on written Chinese influenced early Japanese works, such as the national anthologies written entirely in Chinese, including the Nihon Shoki and the Kaifūsō. However, even in its nascent form, Japanese literature was influenced by native ideas and form. For example, the Man'yōshū, a collection of long poems, contains “a kind of native freshness (Varley 43).” While several entries address continental topics such as Confucianism, Man'yōshū does so against a backdrop of ancient Japanese virtues, such as makoto.

With the invention of kana, a native syllabary derived from Chinese characters, Japanese classical literature blossomed, deviating significantly from the Chinese model under the Heian court. Kana facilitated the growth of native prose literature which was given form in the nikki and monogatari. In Japan, female writers, utilizing kana generally due to being denied a formal education in written Chinese, were responsible for some of the period’s finest works, including The Tale of Genji. The increased use of written Japanese contributed to the growth of waka poetry as well, necessitating the use of complex meanings to overcome the limited sound variation of the Japanese language. Building upon the Japanese reverence for nature’s characteristic fragility, Japanese poetry integrated the flowery language of Chinese poetry into the strict form of the waka, which would remain unchanged for centuries.

The main religious import from the Asian continent was Buddhism, officially introduced from the Korean kingdom of Paekche around 552 (Varley 20). The Japanese ruling class played a key role in the early spread of Buddhism, evidenced by Emperor Shomu’s public endorsement of Buddhism during the Nara period. Official support for Buddhism from the imperial court at Nara shaped many of the unique Japanese sects which would develop in the following generations. Early on, Buddhism was mainly the domain of priests hired to ensure the prosperity of the imperial court. However, the development of an aristocratic class increased the popularity of newly formed esoteric sects, such as Shingon and Tendai during the late Nara period, and eventually Amidism which preached the universality of salvation.

Instead of facilitating a wholesale replacement of Shinto, Buddhism in its various forms fused with Shinto beliefs. “The doctrines of the two religions complement each other so neatly,” according to Varley on page 22. For example, many Japanese regarded Buddhism as a “potent form of magic for... warding off calamities (Varley 21),” and the kami could be regarded as manifestations of Buddhist deities. The capacity for this synthesis of Buddhism and Shinto to be reshaped in various social circumstances, evidenced above, helps explains its persistence as a formidable force in Japanese society and how the Japanese developed unique native sects.

After a period of disruption, Chinese rule was stabilized under the Sui and later T’ang dynasties, allowing for the continuation of missions between Japan and China. These missions provided Japan with the knowledge necessary to pursue a centralized bureaucracy on the model of China. For example, Prince Shotoku, a Confucian scholar and member of the Soga clan, propagated Chinese dynastic customs as a basis for legitimate rule in his Jūshichijō Kenpō. However, such customs were necessarily reconciled with the Shinto belief in a line of succession ordained by Amaterasu. Under future Soga rulers, a series of edicts patterned on the institutions of T’ang China were pursued in Japan to meticulous detail. For example, uncovered tax registers from the period are nearly identical in form to Chinese equivalents (Ryusaku 53).

Ironically, implementation of such reforms allowed Japanese bureaucratic institutions to develop in novel ways. For example, the Taika Reforms beginning in 645 were designed to curb the power of local clan leaders; in practice, aristocratic families accumulated large private estates and political power under the system. This led to a distinct court culture characterized by aristocratic jockeying for the reins of imperial power in the Heian period. Much removed from the Confucian ideals of government by merit, Japanese courtier society was highly hierarchical and featured a fixation on miyabi, or courtly refinement, as reflected primarily in uta nikki like The Pillow Book. While courtier society was supplanted by the warrior class, the new rulers “instinctively responded to and sought to perpetuate the courtly tradition (Varley 60).”

The evolution of Japanese civilization can be thought of as a continuous and selective reconciliation between “native” and “foreign” elements within Japanese society. From its most important imports from the Asian mainland, written Chinese, Buddhism, and a centralized bureaucracy, Japan has forged unique native traditions found nowhere else in the world. Even after coming into contact with the world at large, Japan has retained its ability to produce uniquely Japanese institutions amidst a variety of outside influences.